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INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WILL AS AN
IMPLIED UNILATERAL ARBITRATION CONTRACT
S.L Strong*
In his article, The Will As An Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract,
Professor Gary Spitko offers an intriguing and innovative argument about
how arbitration provisions in wills can be enforced even over the
objection of a beneficiary and even in cases where the beneficiary seeks
to set aside the will in its entirety.1 While I do not agree with all of the
assertions in that Article (for example, the conclusion that "a consensus
is developing that a testator may not compel arbitration of contests to her
will"' 2 appears somewhat premature, given a number of probate cases not
discussed by Professor Spitko3 and recent developments in the arbitration
of internal trust disputes 4), the basic premise of the discussion-that
arbitration provisions in wills can and should be considered to be
contractual in nature and thus enforceable-is sound as a matter of U.S.
probate and arbitration law.5
One item that Professor Spitko does not address in detail is whether
and to what extent his theory would apply to wills that are international
in nature. This is an important issue to consider, given the increasing
number of people who live outside their countries of origin as a result of
globalization.6 The situation has been further exacerbated by the recent
* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.);
J.D., Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California,
Davis. The author is the Manley 0. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and is
qualified as a lawyer in New York, Illinois, and Missouri as well as a solicitor in England and
Wales.
1. See E. Gary Spitko, The WillAs An Implied Unilateral Arbitration Agreement, 68 FLA.
L. REv. 49 (2016).
2. Id. at 53.
3. See, e.g., In re Meredith's Estate, 266 N.W. 351, 354, 356 (Mich. 1936), superseded by
implication by In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W.2d 720, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); In re
Blumenkrantz, 824 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2006), superseding In re Jacobovitz'
Will, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1968); see also Spitko, supra note 1, at 58 n.33
(citing the initial negative decisions but not referring to the more recent decisions).
4. Arbitration of trust disputes has been embraced in a variety of U.S. and foreign
jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (S.I. Strong ed., 2016) [hereinafter ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES]
(examining developments in arbitration of trust disputes both domestically and internationally);
S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Law Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1157 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Two Bodies] (discussing trust law and arbitration
law in the context of international commercial arbitration).
5. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 98.
6. A significant number of Americans live abroad, although precise numbers are difficult
to estimate. See Joe Costanzo & Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Counting the Uncountable:
Overseas Americans, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (May 17, 2013), http://www.migration
policy.org/article/counting-uncountable-overseas-americans (placing the number between 2.2
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economic downturn, which has led many elderly individuals to move to
"retirement havens," where health care and cost of living is more
affordable for those on fixed incomes. As a result, it is necessary to
consider the international implications of Professor Spitko's theory.
As Professor Spitko's article illustrates, this issue needs to be
considered from the perspective of both arbitration law and succession
law, which includes principles relating to donative transfers and intestate
succession.8 In many ways, the arbitration analysis appears relatively
straightforward, since the notion of an implied unilateral contract to
arbitrate is already well-accepted in international circles, at least in
investment cases. Indeed, investment arbitration (also known as investor-
state arbitration) is often referred to as "arbitration without privity" 9
because it constitutes a unilateral offer to arbitrate disputes involving
certain types of foreign investments rather than a bilateral contract
between host state and the individual investor. 10 The offer to arbitrate is
typically reflected in an international treaty, such as a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) or free trade agreement (FTA), but can also be found in the
host country's national laws."
Although investment proceedings are somewhat sui generis,
international commercial arbitration also has experience with what might
be termed implied contracts to arbitrate, primarily in matters involving
non-signatories.1 2 While those issues need to be more fully evaluated
before a final conclusion can be reached about the merits of Professor
Spitko's thesis,1 3 the proposition appears at least arguable as a matter of
million and 6.8 million); Lyman Stone, In An Age of Global Citizenship, American Expatriates
Increase, FEDERALIST (May 4, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/04/in-an-age-of-global-
citizenship-american-expatriates-increase/ (estimating approximately 2.8 million Americans
lived abroad as of 2013, excluding military and diplomatic personnel, long-term tourists and
temporary workers).
7. See Nicholas D. Zeltzer, Note, Foreign-Economic-Retirement Migration: Promises and
Potential, Barriers and Burdens, 16 ELDER L.J. 211, 212 (2008).
8. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 55.
9. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration WithoutPrivity, 10 IC SID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
232, 247, 250, 257 (1995).
10. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 52-54 (2008) (concluding the concept of investment arbitration as
constituting an offer to arbitrate "is no longer controversial").
11. See id. at 25-43.
12. See Thomson-CSF, S.A.v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995); S.I.
Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement of
Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915,
993 (1998); S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an "Agreement in Writing" in International
Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York Convention and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47, 52 n.29 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Agreement].
13. For example, questions could arise as to whether arbitration awards relating to wills
would be considered "an agreement in writing" under certain international conventions facilitating
[Vol. 68
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
international arbitration law. However, questions arise as to whether the
same conclusion can be reached pursuant to cross-border succession law.
The diversity of national laws on succession make a comprehensive
international and comparative analysis impossible in the current
Response. However, the European Union (E.U.) recently adopted a
regional instrument known as the European Succession Regulation
(Regulation) that is applicable in twenty-five different countries and
provides a useful framework for analysis of the relevant issues. 14 The
Regulation not only facilitates resolution of decedents' estates within the
E.U. but also interacts with foreign law, including U.S. law, in a
potentially unanticipated manner. 15 As a result, the Regulation offers a
good starting point for analysis of Professor Spitko's thesis on the will as
an implied unilateral arbitration contract. 16
I. BACKGROUND ON THE REGULATION
At this point, there is not a great deal of commentary or case law
construing the Regulation, since it only came into effect on August 17,
2015.17 However, by its terms, the Regulation addresses a wide range of
issues relating to "conflict of laws, jurisdiction, mutual recognition and
enforcement of decisions in the area of succession." 18 As a piece of E.U.
legislation, the Regulation may at first appear relevant only to E.U.
nationals. However, the applicability of the Regulation is actually based
on "habitual residence," which means that the estates of U.S. nationals
(including dual U.S. nationals) who are habitually resident in the E.U.
will be sub ect to the principles and procedures described in the
Regulation.1
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in international commercial arbitration.
See Strong, Agreement, supra note 12, at 55.
14. See Council Regulation 650/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 107 [hereinafter Regulation]. The
applicability of the Regulation in three additional Member States (Ireland, Denmark and the
United Kingdom) is questionable. See id. paras. 82-83.
15. See id.
16. Although the Regulation addresses a wide variety of testamentary documents as well as
intestate succession, the focus in this discussion will be on its effect on wills, which are expressly
covered by the instrument. See id. para. 9, arts. 1, 3(1)(a). Nevertheless, many of the points made
here are also relevant to trust arbitration, although the Regulation only applies to testamentary
trusts, as opposed to commercial trusts. See id. paras. 9, 13, arts. 1(1), 3(1)(a), 3(1)(d).
17. See id. art. 83(1). The U.K.-based Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP) has
put out a number of useful practice guides, including some written from the perspective of non-
Member States. See European Succession Regulation, STEP, http://www.step.org (last visited
Sept. 28, 2016) (search on European Succession Regulation).
18. See Regulation, supra note 14, para. 5. The Regulation also creates a European
Certificate of Succession to facilitate resolution of succession matters in E.U. Member States. See
id.
19. See id. paras. 23-24, art. 4. The concept of "habitual residence" is subject to a variety
of considerations and exceptions. See id. paras. 32-35, art. 21. A decedent's habitual residence
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U.S. law can be introduced into the Regulation regime by virtue of
Articles 20 and 21, which allow decedents to choose the law applicable
to their estate plans.20 Article 20 specifically states that "[a]ny law
specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law
of a Member State.",21 As a result, parties and their counsel need to be
aware of how the Regulation interacts with U.S. law, including Professor
Spitko's theory of the will as an implied unilateral arbitration contract.
As the following analysis suggests, some factors favor the enforceability
of an arbitration provision found in a will that is subject to the Regulation
while other factors do not.
II. FACTORS FAVORING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS IN WILLS GOVERNED BY U.S. LAW AND SUBJECT
TO THE REGULATION
Several factors suggest that arbitration provisions in wills of U.S.
nationals habitually resident in the E.U. at the time of death will be
enforceable under the Regulation. First, one of the overarching goals of
the Regulation is to respect and promote personal autonomy in matters
involving the disposition of a decedent's estate.22 Although the law
governing matters of succession is usually that of the habitual residence
of the deceased, decedents are free to choose the law of their nationality
23to govern their will and other testamentary instruments. As a result, it
appears possible for American citizens who are habitually resident in the
E.U. to choose to have any disputes arising out of their wills heard in
arbitration, if the will is governed by a U.S. law that considers arbitration
provisions in a will to be enforceable, including under Professor Spitko' s
theory of the will as a type of implied unilateral arbitration contract.24
can affect not only the choice of law but the forum in which succession proceedings will be heard.
See id. arts. 4-19, 21.
20. See id. para. 38, arts. 20-21; Leigh-Alexandra Basha, How to Advise Wealthy U.S.
Families Who Own Foreign Property: Tax, Reporting, and Succession Issues, in PLANNING
TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES para. 15.3 (2016), Westlaw SX020 ALI-CLE 2057 ("The
Regulation provides that a testator can choose the law of his or her nationality to govern his or
her worldwide succession. This means that U.S. citizens can choose U.S. law (more specifically
the state law to which they have the closest connection) to govern their worldwide succession,
including their ownership of French [or other E.U.] property and easily avoid the French [or other
E.U.] forced heirship rules."); see also Regulation, supra note 14, para. 40 ("A choice of law
under this Regulation should be valid even if the chosen law does not provide for a choice of law
in matters of succession.").
21. Regulation, supra note 14, art. 20.
22. See id.
23. See id. para. 38, arts. 20-21. Limiting choice of law to the law of the decedent's
nationality allows states to protect certain important public policies regarding succession, such as
those involving forced heirship.
24. Most U.S. law governing estates is state, rather than federal, in nature. It is unclear
whether and to what extent the Regulation would require a U.S. citizen to choose the law of the
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This conclusion is supported by those aspects of the Regulation that
allow party autonomy in forum selection. For example, Article 5 states
that "[w]here the law chosen by the deceased to govern his succession
pursuant to Article 22 is the law of a Member State, the parties concerned
may agree that a court or the courts of that Member State are to have
exclusive jurisdiction to rule on any succession matter., 25 Although this
provision has its limitations (for example, it does not expressly
contemplate arbitration or allow a decedent to choose a court seated
outside the E.U.), it nevertheless reflects a certain amount of testamentary
freedom regarding forum selection.
One potentially significant problem with the Regulation's forum
selection provision involves the way in which it contemplates active
agreement of all concerned parties as well as a writing that is dated and
26
signed by those persons. However, this requirement need not be fatal to
the arbitration of will disputes, particularly in those jurisdictions that have
adopted mechanisms (such as the direct benefits estoppel theory) that
allow an arbitration provision in a will to bind a beneficiary who has not
expressly consented to that particular procedure if that beneficiary seeks
to take under the will. 27 The problem is that one of the primary benefits
of Professor Spitko's characterization of a will as an implied unilateral
arbitration contract is that it allows the use of arbitration even in cases
where actual and purported beneficiaries, including intestate takers, do
not claim under the will.
28
There are several potential ways to evade this particular requirement.
For example, it might be possible to frame the writing requirement in the29
Regulation as evidentiary rather than substantive in nature. Even if the
requirement was found to be substantive, it might be considered
unnecessary in jurisdictions adopting Professor Spitko's theory of the
will as an implied unilateral arbitration contract, since the validity of that
act would be governed by the chosen law.30
state in which he or she was born, as opposed to the law of another U.S. state with which the
decedent was connected. See id. art. 36(2)(b) (stating that for states with multiple territorial units,
provisions relating to the nationality of the decedent "shall ... be construed as referring to the law
of the territorial unit with which the deceased had the closest connection").
25. Id. art. 5(1); see also id. para. 28.
26. See id. art. 5(2) (noting the writing "shall be . . . dated and signed by the parties
concerned").
27. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 49-50.
28. See id. at 56.
29. See Strong, Agreement, supra note 12, at 67. A writing requirement canbe imposed for
substantive purposes (i.e., to show actual consent) or evidentiary purposes (i.e., to show the
content of the agreement). Id. If the writing requirement is evidentiary, then a writing that is not
signed by the parties (i.e., an arbitration provision in a will) could reflect the content of the
agreement. Id.
30. See Regulation, supra note 14, art. 22(3) ("The substantive validity of the act whereby
the choice of the law was made shall be governed by the chosen law.").
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Alternatively, courts might construe the term "choice-of-court
agreement" strictly to exclude arbitration agreements. 1 To some extent,
it is unclear whether proponents of Professor Spitko's theory would
prefer to have arbitration agreements considered a type of choice of court
agreement or not. If the two mechanisms are considered analogous, then
the Regulation would appear to support the choice of arbitration pursuant
to the principle of party autonomy; however, the Regulation's restrictions
on choice of court agreements may be sufficiently rigorous to deny
recognition of an arbitration provision that does not contain the written
agreement of all concerned parties. 2
When considering this issue, courts will doubtless look at the
Regulation in its entirety, including language stating that
[f]or the purposes of this Regulation, the term 'court'
should... be given a broad meaning so as to cover not only
courts in the true sense of the word, exercising judicial
functions, but also the notaries or registry offices in some
Member States who or which, in certain matters of
succession, exercise judicial functions like courts, and the
notaries and legal professionals who, in some Member
States, exercise judicial function in a given succession by
delegation of power by a court .
Other provisions similarly state that "succession matters in some
Member States may be dealt with by non-judicial authorities, such as
notaries" and contemplate the possibility of amicable out-of-court
settlements (which might even include mediated settlements) involving a
particular succession dispute 4 These statements could support an
argument in favor of arbitration of disputes arising under the Regulation
because they demonstrate the legitimacy of various types of non-judicial
forms of dispute resolution. This conclusion is supported as a matter of
theory, since most if not all jurisdictions frame arbitration as involving a
grant of jurisdictional authority from the state 5
This outcome may be further supported by Article 23(2) of the
Regulation, which states that
[t]he [chosen] law shall govern in particular:
31. See id. art. 5.
32. See id.
33. Id. para. 20; see also id. art. 3(2).
34. Id. para. 36.
35. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION paras. 5-1 to 5-31 (2003) (discussing theoretical basis of arbitration); S.I. Strong,
Discovery Under 28 U.S. C. § 1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and
International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEXLITIG. 295, 331-50 (2013).
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(a) the causes, time and place of the opening of the
succession [and]
(b) the determination of the beneficiaries, of their respective
shares and of the obligations which may be imposed on them
by the deceased, and the determination of other succession
rights ... 36
While this provision does not explicitly mention the method by which
disputes are to be resolved, the reference to the "time and place of the
opening of the succession" and the determination of the beneficiaries'
shares and obligations could be read to require enforcement of an
arbitration provision in the will.
Although the Regulation's definition of the term "court" is quite
broad, some limitations do exist. 37 For example, Article 3 indicates that
decisions rendered by judicial and similar types of authority need to be
capable of being "made the subject of an appeal to or review by a judicial
authority" and must "have a similar force and effect of as a decision of a
judicial authority on the same matter," which could be interpreted to
preclude arbitration of Regulation-related disputes.3 8 However, this
argument does not carry much weight, since arbitral awards are currently
subject to judicial review, albeit of a limited nature, and are considered
final and binding to the same extent as judicial decisions.39
Support for arbitration of disputes arising under the Regulation can
also be found in Article 75, which states that "[t]his Regulation shall not
affect the application of international conventions to which one or more
Member States are party at the time of adoption of this Regulation., 40 All
of the Member States of the E.U. are currently signatories of the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), which states, in mandatory
terms, that
[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
36. Regulation, supra note 14, art. 23(2)(a)-(b). This article includes a number of other
issues that may be governed by the chosen law. See id. art. 23.
37. See id.
38. Id. art. 3 (2).
39. See LEWETAL., supra note 35, at para. 24-1; see also infra note 59 and accompanying
text (regarding scope of arbitral review).
40. Regulation, supra note 14, art. 75(1); see also id. para. 73. But see id. para. 75(2) (giving
precedence to the Regulation in matters involving two Member States).
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relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 41
At this point, it is unclear whether the New York Convention applies
to wills, although commentators have argued that it is applicable to other
testamentary instruments, such as testamentary trusts. 42 Perhaps the
biggest obstacle to the enforcement of arbitration provisions in wills
arises under Article 11(2), which states that "[t]he term 'agreement in
writing' shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams. '' 43 As Professor Spitko notes, opponents of succession-related
arbitration often argue that a will is not a contract, although that argument
has not precluded arbitration in trust-related disputes, particularly among
courts who define an "arbitration agreement" more broadly than a
"contract. ' '44 Furthermore, courts have not yet contemplated the
possibility that a will could be considered an implied unilateral contract
between the testator and the state and whether that type of arrangement
could be considered enforceable, perhaps in a manner similar to that
involving offers to arbitrate in the context of international investment
45disputes. While this issue needs to be explored further, disputes that are
successfully brought within the terms of the New York Convention will
benefit from the mandatory provisions of Article 11(1) and thus will be
46sent to arbitration.
The European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention)
is another international treaty worth considering. 7 Some commentators
have claimed that Article 6.1 of the European Convention precludes
certain types of arbitration, such as those involving testamentary trusts,
on the grounds that the European Convention guarantees parties the right
41. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art.
11(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see
also Status Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention
status.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) (listing Contracting Parties, which includes the United
States).
42. See Sarah Ganz, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Arising Jrom an Internal
Trust Arbitration: Issues Under the New York Convention, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES,
supra note 4, at 494; Margaret L. Moses, International Enforcement of an Arbitration Provision
in a Trust: Questions Involving the New York Convention, in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES,
supra note 4, at 467; Strong, Two Bodies, supra note 4, at 1213-19.
43. New York Convention, supra note 41, art. 11(2).
44. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 57-58; Strong, Two Bodies, supra note 4, at 1209-30.
45. See Spitko, supra note 1, at 67; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
46. See New York Convention, supra note 41, art. 11(1).
47. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
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to a public trial, which differs from arbitration. 48 However, numerous
forms of arbitration have been determined to be consistent with the
European Convention. 49 As a result, arbitration of disputes arising under
the Regulation would not be per se barred by the European Convention,
although further analysis would be necessary to ensure that this type of
arbitration fell within the permitted parameters.50 Similar issues might
arise under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
which is explicitly mentioned in the Regulation and which also protects
the right to a fair and public trial.51
III. FACTORS DISFAVORING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS IN WILLS GOVERNED BY U.S. LAW AND SUBJECT
TO THE REGULATION
As the preceding discussion suggested, a variety of factors favor the
enforceability of an arbitration provision in a will that is governed by U. S.
law and subject to the Regulation. However, other elements suggest the
opposite conclusion.
The first issue to consider involves the silence of the Regulation
regarding arbitration. Although further research is necessary to determine
whether and to what extent silence can be used as a means of interpreting
the Regulation as a matter of European law, opponents to arbitration are
sure to argue that the failure to contemplate arbitration suggests that
mechanism should not be permitted in succession-related matters, even if
U.S. law controls.
Another anticipated argument against enforcement of arbitration
48. See Mark Herbert, Trust Arbitration in England and Wales: The Trust Law Committee,
in ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES, supra note 4, at 228, 246-52 (considering Article 6.1 in the
context of trust disputes). Article 6.1 states
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.
European Convention, supra note 47, art. 6.1.
49. See LEW ET AL., supra note 35, paras. 5-57 to 5-67 (discussing cases); Adam Samuel,
Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution Generally and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 413, 416-19, 426-47 (2004) (stating that parties consenting to arbitration
waive their rights under Article 6(1) of the European Convention).
50. See European Convention, supra note 47.
51. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 391 [hereinafter E.U. Charter]; Regulation, supra note 14, paras. 58, 81.
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provisions in wills arises out of the Regulation's public policy
52provisions. In many ways, this claim would appear difficult to make,
since the language in question-"[t]he application of a provision of the
law of any State [including that of the United States] specified by this
Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum"-
suggests a somewhat heightened standard.53 However, the right to a
public trial is considered fundamental in European jurisprudence and may
therefore receive robust protection, particularly given the deep-seated
hostility some members of the succession law community exhibit toward
arbitration.54
The interpretation of the public policy exception may be further
affected by language in the Regulation stating that "[t]he rights of heirs
and legatees, of other persons close to the deceased and of creditors of
the succession must be effectively guaranteed. 55 At this point, it is
unclear whether and to what extent courts will consider arbitration
sufficiently protective of the rights of the designated class of persons,
particularly if some of the affected individuals-for example, creditors-
can be considered third parties that should not be required to participate
56in an arbitration.
Another issue that may be relevant to the interpretation of the public
policy exception involves the fact that court settlements are considered
proper under the Regulation.57 Although such settlements require a court
to approve the terms of the agreement before the agreement is considered
binding, it is to some extent unclear why party autonomy should prevail
in matters involving negotiation or mediation but not arbitration. 58
Indeed, the only reason why a court would deny approval to a negotiated
or mediated settlement would be in cases where the process violated basic
52. See Regulation supra note 14, para. 58, art. 35.
53. Id. art. 35 (emphasis added). Ordre public is the civil law version of public policy and
is sometimes construed to be somewhat broader than public policy in the U.S. sense. See Fernando
Mantilla-Serrano, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy, 20 ARB. INT'L 333, 334
(2004) ("In the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, the meaning of 'public policy' is relatively narrow,
referring to 'matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare, and the like' and is distinguishable
from matters related to due process. In the continental European tradition public policy, or ordre
public, refers to a wider range of judicial concerns, a range that 'encompasses breaches of
procedural justice."' (footnotes omitted)).
54. See E.U. Charter, supra note 51, art. 47; European Convention, supra note 47, art. 6.1;
Strong, Two Bodies, supra note 4, at 1162 & n. 16 (discussing the "blinding prejudice" of some
members of the succession law community toward arbitration); see supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
55. Regulation, supra note 14, para. 7.
56. Professor Spitko's article does not appear to distinguish between creditor claims and
beneficiary claims.
57. See Regulation, supra note 14, arts. 3(h), 61.
58. See id. art. 3(h).
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principles of procedural fairness or where the content of the agreement
violated public policy. Both grounds of objection are also available in
matters resolved through arbitration, which suggests that arbitration
should be considered on a par with negotiation and mediation under the
Regulation.59
IV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion suggests, Professor Spitko's theory of the
will as an implied unilateral arbitration contract is not only important
domestically, but also internationally. While it is unclear whether and to
what extent his thesis will be applicable to disputes arising under the
Regulation, this is an issue that needs to be considered whenever a U.S.
citizen residing in the E.U. drafts a will governed by U.S. law and
includes an arbitration provision. While such provisions may not
currently be routine, the increased interest in arbitration of probate-
related disputes suggests they will not be long in coming.
59. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 41, art. V; United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, arts.
34-35, 18th Sess., I12thplen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), amended by UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 39th Sess., 64th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/61/17 (July 7, 2006).
